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Summary. Under the Labour government, Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in 
England were responsible for the delivery of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) – 
agreed targets between central and local government. This paper uses statistical 
techniques and local authority case studies to explore the impact of LAAs on LSPs’ 
efforts to promote social cohesion. The results suggest that LSPs with an LAA for 
social cohesion experienced a better rate of improvement in community 
cohesiveness than those without, and that tougher targets resulted in stronger 
improvement. The impact of changes in LSPs approaches to promoting social 
cohesion appears to be responsible for this finding.  
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Introduction 
The cohesiveness of local communities has long been a central concern of social 
scientists (see Friedkin, 2004). More recently, it has become a key theme within 
public policy debates across the globe. Governments have sought to encourage 
local agencies to collaborate in order to deliver joined-up solutions to the challenges 
posed by increasing social diversity and anxieties about ethnic tensions (Marcuse, 
1993; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). In the UK, these developments were 
especially prominent during the 2000s. The Labour government of that time 
developed multiple policies to promote social cohesion (Lowndes and Thorp, 2011). 
One such policy instrument that was applied to the issue of social cohesion were 
Local Area Agreements (LAAs) – performance contracts between central 
government and the Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) held responsible for 
coordinating multi-agency approaches across local communities in England. About 
half of the LSPs (86) in England were subject to Local Area Agreements specifying 
targets for desired levels of social cohesion. 
 LAAs have recently been abolished by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, but the role that such performance contracts might play in 
building cohesive communities remains of great interest. Concerns about social 
cohesion are highly evident across multiple levels of government in many European 
countries. The European Union (EU) too is deeply committed to promoting better 
approaches to managing demographic diversity in order to uphold social cohesion 
(European Commission, 2009). At the same time, the potential effectiveness of 
central initiatives to build social cohesion is of considerable salience, both across the 
EU (European Commission, 2011) and also within the UK, where an alternative 
doctrine of local freedom has now been embraced as the means to build the “big 
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society” (Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) 2010a). Finally, 
negotiated performance contracts remain an important tool within the apparatus of 
public sector management in many countries across the globe (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005). This paper will therefore provide 
empirical evidence on the application of a negotiated performance management 
regime to a cross-cutting policy issue of high political salience. 
Research on the role that local agencies can play in building social cohesion 
when working together has so far paid scant attention to the impact of target-setting, 
focusing rather on the coordination challenges posed by partnership working 
(Entwistle et al. 2007). At the same time, little attention has been paid to the efficacy 
(or otherwise) of LAAs (Gillanders and Ahmad 2007 for example, focus upon the 
early experiences of partner organizations involved in the formulation and 
implementation of LAAs). Indeed, to date, few empirical studies have systematically 
examined the relationship between targets and outcomes for local people more 
generally (for a notable exception, see Boyne and Chen’s (2007) analysis of 
education achievements). Thus, despite the widespread debates about the merits of 
partnership and target-setting, important gaps remain in our understanding of the 
role that they can play in delivering improved outcomes for local people.  
To explore the impact of LAAs on social cohesion, we use multivariate 
statistical techniques to examine the relationship between LAA targets per se and 
their relative “toughness” on the standard UK measure of social cohesion: residents’ 
perceptions of the extent to which people from different backgrounds get on well. 
This analysis is then supplemented with qualitative evidence drawn from a sample of 
LSPs with highly divergent degrees of target toughness.  In the first part of the paper, 
the policy context surrounding LSPs, LAAs and the issue of social cohesion is 
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described. Next, theoretical perspectives on the relationship between targets and 
public service outcomes are explored to derive arguments about the likely effects of 
LAAs on social cohesion. Following this, measures of social cohesion, targets and 
target toughness are identified and described, as well as other variables which may 
impact on social cohesion. Statistical evidence on the impact of LAAs on residents’ 
perceptions of social cohesion across the areas served by LSPs across England is 
then presented and set in the context of qualitative evidence on LSPs’ work aimed at 
building community cohesion. Finally, the findings are analysed and the implications 
for future academic research and policy-making are discussed. 
 
Local Strategic Partnerships, Local Area Agreements and Social 
Cohesion 
Broadly speaking, communities and societies are cohesive when aggregate level 
conditions ‘are producing positive membership attitudes and behaviours’ (Friedkin, 
2004, p.410). The activities of local public agencies are likely to play an important 
role in building the potential for the production of such attitudes within any given 
area, though the means by which they seek to do this is likely to vary in line with the 
policy goals being pursued. For example, Lowndes and Thorp (2011) identify three 
modes of social cohesion existing in different localities across the UK. The first, the 
'communitarian mode', is conceived in terms of shared values, aiming to build 
individuals' self-esteem and sense of belonging (2011: 519). The 'republican mode' 
places emphasis on political values and seeks cohesion through active citizenship, 
participation in local politics and inter-group communication (p.521). Finally, the 
focus of the 'neo-liberal mode' is on social inclusion, where cohesion is sought 
through economic means underpinned by security interventions (p.524). 
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In the UK (and increasingly elsewhere), the so-called “crisis of social cohesion” 
prompted by the fragmentation of established identities in the wake of globalisation 
(Kearns and Forrest, 2000) led to the introduction of policies which made public 
organizations responsible for addressing the effects of this profound social change. 
Coupled with the turn to partnership working within the public sector, the fate of local 
communities became firmly tied to the development of joined-up governance 
arrangements across the multiple agencies present within local areas (Eurofound, 
2006). 
Theories of joined-up governance suggest that “wicked issues”, such as the 
relative cohesiveness of local communities, are ‘bigger than any single organization’, 
so collaboration is necessary for ‘making progress in alleviating the problem’ (Raab 
and Milward, 2003: 414). Although individual agencies develop considerable 
expertise within their mandated area, wicked issues cut across or fall between these 
boundaries (Rittel and Weber, 1973). Thus, a ‘multi-agency partnership response 
which harnesses the strengths and expertise of a variety of welfare perspectives’ 
may have a better prospect of addressing intractable wicked issues (Milbourne et al., 
2003: 19). To this end, the Labour government introduced a statutory requirement in 
England for representatives from the local statutory, voluntary, community and 
private sectors to come together in Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) to address 
local problems, allocate funding for cross-cutting projects, and agree on service 
delivery strategies.  
LSPs were first established in 2000 with the intention of encouraging joint 
working, by breaking down the departmentalism and 'silo working' that prevented the 
most efficient allocation of resources to address the wicked issues confronting local 
communities. The structure of LSPs was determined at the local level, resulting in 
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some variation in the composition, structure and processes of partnerships across 
England. Funding for the work of LSPs largely came from the statutory bodies (e.g. 
local authorities and primary care trusts) involved in them – though monies from 
specific initiatives, such as Neighbourhood Renewal Funding, could also be utilised. 
As LSPs evolved, so too did government policy on the role and responsibilities of the 
partnerships. In particular, LSPs became responsible for negotiating and 
implementing the Local Area Agreements (LAAs) – performance contracts between 
central government departments (represented by regional Government Offices in the 
negotiations) and each partnership – that replaced the Local Public Service 
Agreements (LPSAs) which set service improvement targets for local authorities. 
Local Area Agreements were based on the idea that local public organizations 
can be incentivised to work together and improve outcomes by introducing 
performance contracts to focus their combined efforts. It meant that a range of 
organizations in an area (i.e in Bournemouth: the Council, Dorset Police, 
Bournemouth & Poole Primary Care Trust and Prejudice Free Bournemouth & Poole 
Group) were expected to join-up locally to try and address targeted indicators, such 
as local residents’ perceptions of social cohesion within the area. Where LAAs 
represented a break from the LPSAs was that they ‘focused on the delivery of 
outcomes for the area rather than the performance of individual institutions’ (CLG, 
unpublished report: 1). This emphasis on wider area outcomes clearly marked out a 
new phase in the development of the Labour government’s target regime, with the 
broader area-based focus allied with an area-based performance improvement 
regime (Comprehensive Area Assessment), inevitably requiring the involvement of 
multiple stakeholders.  
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There was some unease about the LAA target approach from those working 
in local government. This stemmed partly from the view that this was another policy 
where local political leadership was being circumvented and also because there was 
not a shared vision about what LAAs aimed to do and where power lay in the 
process. Gillanders and Ahmad explained that ‘Localities tended to see LAAs mainly 
as  dialogue, central departments viewed them increasingly as contracts, and 
Government Offices were caught in the middle trying to satisfy both sides’ (2007: 
750). While the policy aimed to deliver better outcomes by improving co-ordination 
(ODPM 2004), stakeholders complained about having to deal with different 
government departments who were not joined up. Central government also placed 
pressure on LSPs to include certain issues (e.g. obesity) in a LAA where this was not 
necessarily a local priority.In theory, it was expected that LAA targets would help 
LSPs focus their strategic activity on wicked issues, such as social cohesion or youth 
unemployment. Within the context of this study, the LAA for social cohesion relied 
upon the setting of targets for improvements in the national indicator for social 
cohesion (NI1), which asked a representative sample of residents in each of the 
areas served by LSPs how well people from diverse backgrounds got on in that area. 
The development of targets for improvements on this indicator, presuppose that 
LSPs are able to coordinate the activities of a complex and multi-agency network of 
local and regional organisations, which can contribute to the sense of cohesiveness 
amongst the residents within the area that they serve. But why might the setting of 
such a target be expected to lead to subsequent improvements in social cohesion? 
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Target-setting and outcomes for local people 
The role of target-setting in the public sector is one of the most hotly debated and 
contested topics in public policy and administration (see Bevan and Hood, 2006) and 
was a key part of the New Labour government’s modernisation agenda (Downe and 
Martin, 2008). Supporters of target-setting argue that it provides a clear sense of 
direction for organizations and can motivate people to focus extra attention on the 
pursuit of better outcomes (Capon et al, 1987). Indeed, theorists of the merits of goal 
clarity in public organizations emphasise that crystallising organizational aims into 
precise well-defined objectives is essential to ensuring that public managers can 
successfully negotiate the demands of myriad stakeholders without succumbing to 
the political pressures they exert (Chun and Rainey, 2005). 
Critics of target-setting, however, argue that it restricts employees’ innate 
sense of mission and may cause attention to be excessively focused upon the target 
that is being measured (Mintzberg, 1994), leading to a corresponding neglect of 
other important areas of organizational functioning (Wankhade, 2011). Moreover, 
narrowly defined goals can de-motivate staff who resent the imposition of expected 
levels of productivity. Quinn (1980), for example, suggests that vague organizational 
goals have a greater prospect of success because they can be interpreted and 
pursued in a multitude of different but equally valid ways – an argument that builds 
on Lindblom’s classic (1959) arguments about the merits of “muddling through” in 
public sector organizations. The setting of targets, on this reading, may diminish 
professional autonomy by reducing the opportunity for staff to use their own 
discretion to set goals for public service provision. But what does existing empirical 
research tell us about the validity of these competing theoretical positions?  
 9 
Despite numerous trenchant critiques of the effects of target-setting offered by 
many scholars (e.g. Bevan and Hood 2006; Wankhade, 2011), to date, systematic 
empirical evidence supporting these arguments against targets has yet to emerge. 
Rodgers and Hunter’s (1992) meta-analysis of 30 studies of management by 
objectives (MBOs – clear goal-setting and performance feedback) in public 
organizations finds that ‘100 percent of the public sector studies reported productivity 
or performance gain after the introduction of MBO’ (1992: 33). Since that early 
review, a trickle of empirical studies has emerged that largely contribute further 
evidence on the merits of targets for public sector organizations. 
The introduction of targets in the Flemish Employment Service is found by 
Verhoest (2005) to have prompted improved performance. Boyne and Chen’s (2007) 
study of LPSAs and the school examination results of Local Education Authorities in 
England furnishes further support for the argument that the presence of targets is 
associated with service improvement. Likewise, Kelman and Friedman (2009) 
attribute shorter waiting times experienced by English NHS patients to the 
introduction of targets. Binderkrantz et al (2011) find that a larger proportion of 
production and project initiation goals within the performance contracts of Danish 
government agencies enhance goal attainment; though, Boyne and Gould-Williams 
(2003) study of Welsh local government managers indicates that performance may 
be negatively related to the sheer number of targets set. Although research on 
target-setting has yet to pay significant attention to cross-cutting outcomes for local 
people, such as social cohesion, it is, then, conceivable that targets may have 
benefits for these outcomes as well as for more tightly defined organizational goals. 
We therefore hypothesise that LSPs with an LAA for social cohesion will produce a 
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better rate of improvement in levels of community cohesiveness than those without a 
target. 
In addition to debating the merits of target-setting per se, public administration 
scholars have also discussed the extent to which the relative toughness or “stretch” 
in a target may have beneficial of harmful effects for outcomes (see Boyne and 
Chen, 2007). These debates were taken up by the Labour government, which sought 
to introduce elements of “stretch” into locally determined targets. The introduction of 
this stretch aspect was especially important for the performance contracts agreed 
with LSPs because each LSP starts from a different baseline. An easy target, so the 
theory goes, may be less likely to inspire or motivate managers to improve public 
services than a more challenging one. Studies of the determinants of individual 
motivation suggest that difficult but achievable targets are associated with greater 
effort and achievement (e.g. Latham et al, 2008; Walker and Boyne 2006). Thus, 
outcomes for local people may be more likely to be boosted if LAAs “stretch” LSPs to 
improve beyond their existing level of achievement. This leads to the hypothesis that 
LSPs with tougher social cohesion LAAs will improve the most. 
 
Data and measures 
The units of analysis for our study are the areas served by Local Strategic 
Partnerships in England (i.e. the 150 jurisdictions that were served by single and 
upper-tier local authorities). Eighty-six of these partnerships were subject to Local 
Area Agreements specifying targets for desired levels of social cohesion. As such, 
the areas served by LSPs are a particularly suitable context for investigating the 
potential impact of target-setting on social cohesion. In addition to the introduction of 
LAAs for social cohesion, broad concerns about a ‘civic deficit’ in the UK led the 
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Labour government to introduce a slew of initiatives to support and promote 
community development in the areas served by local authorities (see Andrews et al 
2008). At the same time, this focus on the local as the source of social cohesion is 
continuing under the coalition government; albeit with a much less state-centric 
emphasis (Sullivan, 2012). 
 
Dependent variable 
For this study, social cohesion is measured as an attitudinal phenomenon reflecting 
individuals’ perceptions of the cohesiveness of their local community (see Moody 
and White, 2003). Quantitative data on citizens’ perceptions of social cohesion within 
the areas served by LSPs are drawn from the General User Survey conducted by 
local authorities across England in 2006 and the Place Survey carried out in 2008. 
Both surveys asked a representative sample of residents a series of questions about 
the quality of life in their local area. Data were independently verified by the Audit 
Commission. Each local authority was required to achieve a sample size of 1,100 
based on a confidence interval of +/-3% at the 95% confidence level.  
The questions within the General User and Place Surveys were all based on a 
5-point response scale with the published figures showing those agreeing with the 
survey statements as a percentage of those responding to the question (see CLG, 
2007; 2008). An item assessing whether respondents believed that people from 
diverse backgrounds got on well together in the area was included in both surveys 
specifically to gauge perceived levels of social cohesion. This question became the 
standard survey item used by the Labour government as an indicator of a cohesive 
society. It captures the overall degree of harmony between groupings based on 
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social class and economic position, as well as those based on faith or ethnic 
identities (CLG, 2008).  
 To gauge the extent to which the introduction of an LAA for social cohesion 
led to improvements in cohesiveness, a rate of improvement measure was 
constructed by calculating the percentage change in the rate of cohesion between 
2006 and 2008. Thus, the statistical modelling provides an indication of how much 
difference the independent and control variables made to changes in perceived 
social cohesion during the time that LAAs were introduced. 
 
Independent variables 
To assess the effects of an LAA for social cohesion, dichotomous variables are 
created coding LSPs with a LAA for social cohesion 1 (target on) and all the others 0 
(target off). The degree of LAA stretch is then measured using a dichotomous 
variable that codes the rate of improvement required to achieve an LAA based on 
perceptions of cohesion in the year prior to introduction of the LAA (i.e. the indicator 
score in 2006), and coded zero if no LAA is present. Missing data mean that the 
target stretch analysis is carried out on a slightly smaller sample of cases.  
 
Control variables 
Socio-economic disadvantage. The relative socio-economic disadvantage of citizens 
was measured using the average ward score on the indices of deprivation for each 
of the areas served by an LSP in 2007. Communities experiencing socio-economic 
disadvantage arguably lack the resources to solve collective action problems 
(Kornhauser, 1978), have high levels of crime and disorder (Kawachi, Kennedy & 
Wilkinson, 1999), and thereby correspondingly lower levels of cohesiveness. 
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Demographic diversity. The sheer number of alternative social identities in 
demographically diverse areas may problematise efforts to enhance cohesion. For 
example, ethnically diverse areas may suffer from low levels of social trust (Alesina 
& La Ferrara, 2002), areas with a wide spread of age groups greater generational 
conflict (Withers, 1997), and those with high social class diversity, confrontation 
between different sectional interests (Costa & Kahn, 2003). To measure 
demographic diversity, the proportions of the age, ethnic and social class sub-groups 
identified in the 2001 UK national census (e.g. children aged 0-4, Black African and 
Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations), for each LSP area were squared, 
summed and subtracted from 10,000, with a high score reflecting high diversity.  
 
Social alienation. Population size and density figures for 2001 control for the 
possibility that residents of bigger, more densely populated urban areas experience 
higher levels of social alienation and disaffection (Oliver, 2000). Moreover, cities with 
dense populations may offer greater opportunities for criminal and delinquent 
behaviour to flourish (Kposowa et al  1995), in turn, damaging perceptions of 
cohesiveness.  
 
Government resources To develop and empirically test for the impact of LAAs, it is 
also necessary to control for the distribution of government resources to promote 
social cohesion within the areas served by LSPs. Thus, a measure of the 
neighbourhood renewal funding per capita allocated by UK central government is 
included in the models to control for the financial resources made available to LSPs 
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to produce better social and economic outcomes in disadvantaged areas (Social 
Exclusion Unit, 2001).  
 
Local government structure To control for differences between type of LSP area 
within the analysis three dichotomous variables are created: a) coding 1 for county 
council areas and all other areas; b) coding 1 for London borough areas and all other 
areas; c) coding 1 for metropolitan borough areas and all other areas. Unitary 
authority areas are the reference category. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables 
used in the modelling of social cohesion. Logged versions of population and 
population density were used in the analysis.  
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
Statistical findings 
Results for statistical tests of the relationship between LAAs and the rate of 
improvement in social cohesion across the areas served by LSPs are shown in 
Table 2. Three Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) models are presented: 
model 1 regresses the control variables on to the rate of improvement in social 
cohesion. The results when the ‘target on’ dummy variable is included in the 
equation are shown in model 2. Finally, model 3 substitutes the target stretch 
variable for the ‘target on’ measure.  
 
[Table 2 Here] 
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The statistical results provide virtually no support for the proposed 
relationships between the control variables and the rate of improvement in social 
cohesion. Although the signs for the coefficients are mostly in the expected 
directions, only the variable controlling for whether or not an LSP operates within a 
metropolitan borough is statistically significant. Part of the reason for the absence of 
statistically significant relationships here is that by taking the rate of improvement as 
the dependent variable we effectively control for the impact of past levels of social 
cohesion on present levels. Indeed, when one examines the effects of the control 
variables on raw levels of cohesion in both 2006 and 2008, numerous statistically 
significant relationships emerge. At the same time though, the finding on the 
challenges faced by LSPs seeking to improve social cohesion in metropolitan 
boroughs is an intriguing one. These areas are located in large Northern and 
Midland urban conurbations where racial tensions were particularly high during the 
early 2000s (Webster 2003). Indeed, it was a series of race riots in Bradford, Burnley 
and Oldham which prompted the emergence of social cohesion as a key policy goal 
of the Labour government (Hudson et al. 2007). This finding may therefore mirror 
other evidence, which underscores the difficulties that a legacy of ethnic tension 
poses for social cohesion in urban areas (e.g. Uitermark et al. 2005).   
Despite the moderate statistical power of the first model, the introduction of 
the ‘target on’ measure provides some support for the argument that the introduction 
of an LAA for social cohesion will result in improved outcomes for local people. The 
coefficient for the ‘target on’ measure is positive and statistically significant and its 
inclusion in the regression model makes a small statistically significant addition to 
the explanatory power of the regression model of about two per cent. In a survey of 
LAA co-ordinators, 90% of the respondents agreed that an outcomes framework 
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based on negotiated and shared targets was a useful lever in delivering the LAA 
(and 60% thought that the National Indicator Set was useful). And over three 
quarters of respondents thought a duty on identified partners to have regard to 
specific targets in the LAA brought more change than would otherwise have been 
the case (CLG, 2010b).  The size of the coefficient for the ‘target on’ measure in our 
statistical model suggests that LSPs with an LAA for social cohesion have been able 
to improve (or reduce deteriorations in) perceptions of social cohesion by almost a 
whole percentage point more (0.95) than those without an LAA. Although 
substantively this effect size is comparatively small, the third model presented in 
Table 2 indicates that the degree of stretch in the target exerts a much greater 
impact on the rate of improvement in social cohesion.  
The target stretch measure makes a large statistically significant addition to 
the explanatory power of the regression model of about 35 per cent. Substantively, 
the size of the coefficient for the stretch measure suggests that for every percentage 
point increase in target toughness, there is a corresponding .65 per cent 
improvement in perceptions of social cohesion in those local areas served by LSPs 
with a social cohesion LAA. This is clearly a very sizeable effect size and one that 
points towards strong target stretch benefits. In fact, an unpublished report 
concludes that, ‘the prime benefit of LAAs was that they provided the impetus to joint 
working on priorities especially where there were particular challenges’ (CLG, 2010b: 
30). 
There are a number of potential ways in which contracting for cohesion at the 
local level might lead to enhanced joint-working. Firstly, it is conceivable that LSPs 
with more stretch in their social cohesion LAAs are working harder and better to 
improve residents’ perceptions of their local community than those with less stretch 
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in their LAA, especially by investing more in community development and public 
participatory activities. Previous research suggests such work can positively 
influence cohesiveness (Andrews et al 2011). At the same time, LSPs pressurised to 
meet tough cohesion targets may well have carried out publicity and advertising 
campaigns. Prior studies have suggested that public attitudes towards government 
can be altered through the use of simple, cost-effective marketing strategies 
(Berman, 1997; Ipsos-MORI 2006). To explore the potential causal mechanisms at 
work here we draw upon qualitative data on the work of those LSPs with the 
‘toughest’ and ‘easiest’ targets in promoting social cohesion. 
 
LAAs as drivers of change 
One of the principal reasons the five LSPs with the toughest social cohesion targets 
(Barking and Dagenham, Newham, Bournemouth, Southend and Peterborough) 
cited for negotiating a tough LAA was the impetus such a target would give to work 
aimed at responding to community tensions around the issue of immigration. In 
Barking and Dagenham, the British National Party (BNP) formed the largest 
opposition party on the council between 2006 and 2010, and community tension was 
placed on the council’s risk register. In Newham, the LSP regarded the cohesion 
LAA as an excellent opportunity to institute a new coordinated approach to dealing 
with the large numbers of undocumented immigrants in the borough (Newham, 
2007). In Bournemouth and Peterborough, the integration of the large number of 
Central and Eastern European migrant workers living within the area was identified 
as a major priority for the LSPs (Dorset Race Equality Council, 2010; Peterborough, 
2006), while in Southend, increased BNP activity coupled with rising levels of 
immigration brought local agencies together (Barber, 2010). 
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The agreement of stretching LAAs for social cohesion led each of the above 
LSPs to carry out extensive new activities to improve their performance on this 
measure. This work tended to be ‘communitarian’ based around efforts to engage 
with civil society and voluntary sector organizations to build shared values within the 
community (Lowndes and Thorp, 2011), though there was also evidence of initiatives 
with a more consumerist ‘neo-liberal’ orientation.  
 
Community development activities 
In Barking and Dagenham, new funding was provided for the Volunteer Bureau and 
the ‘Giving Back’ awards during Peace Week. Alongside the introduction of new 
events like the Rising Star awards for young people, guidance was also produced for 
schools and governors on promoting shared values, and the Faith Forum 
commissioned to drive inter-faith work in the area. In Newham, the Council (along 
with partners) introduced events such as the Mayor’s Newham Show and smaller 
Community Forums. In addition, Active Community Teams made up of volunteers 
working with local councillors were set up in nine areas to hold free events and 
identify local priorities.  
In Bournemouth, the LSP developed a series of ‘bridging’ projects, such as 
multi-cultural days and sport activities to celebrate the values of different immigrant 
communities. In Southend, the work of the Association of Voluntary Services was 
expanded to empower local people to have a greater voice and role in provision of 
local services. In addition to coordinating the Ethnic Minority Forum and the Polish 
Surgeries and Festival in the area, three other activities involving the LSP stand out. 
The Turning Tides initiative that brought together statutory, private and voluntary 
sector organisations to address local priorities, the Active Citizens programme that 
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supported residents to build neighbourhood improvement networks, and the multi-
sectoral programme Citizen Power, which sought to generate ‘sustainable 
citizenship’ through the medium of art events.    
 
Marketing and communication campaigns 
Barking and Dagenham LSP published a Community Cohesion strategy in 2007, and 
the local authority now routinely considers community cohesion impacts when 
designing new policies. It has also significantly expanded representation on the 
borough’s Tension Monitoring Group and provides a Welcome Pack to anyone 
moving into the borough. Moreover, the local authority was commended by central 
government for its innovative work addressing urban myths (e.g. ‘Africans are being 
paid to come to Barking and Dagenham’ or that public services disproportionately 
favour black minority ethnic residents).  
In Bournemouth, the LSP developed new initiatives to reduce prejudice and 
discrimination and improve confidence to report hate crime, such as appointing a 
Community Cohesion Officer and forming a Prejudice Free Bournemouth and Poole 
Group. A County-wide publicity campaign was also instituted to highlight reporting of 
racist/homophobic incidents. In Peterborough, in addition to the introduction of a 
migrant English language skills and knowledge programme, the New Link community 
service was set up to help newcomers integrate by advertising training and job 
opportunities, and informing them about the legal requirements of living in Britain and 
volunteering roles.  
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LAAs as drivers of consolidation 
The context in the five LSPs with the least stretch in their cohesion LAA was not 
radically dissimilar to that in those LSPs with the most stretch in their LAA. Camden, 
Rochdale, Sandwell and Knowsley all contain wards with high levels of deprivation, 
some of which have experienced significant racial tensions, and others of which 
have seen the BNP become more visible. In East Sussex, the LAA was centred on 
work going on in Hastings Borough Council to address tensions associated with the 
presence of large numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers within that particular 
area. It is not, therefore, in the contextual circumstances that the different outcomes 
for more and less challenging LAAs can be found.  
There are a number of different reasons why authorities may have set ‘soft’ 
targets. In some cases, there may have been some complacency. In Knowsley, for 
example, the black and minority ethnic population represents less than 2% of the 
population and no community cohesion strategy was in place until 2009. At the same 
time, there were also disagreements between some of these LSPs and the 
government about the measurement of NI1, with the LSPs subscribing to lower 
baseline figures (which would actually render their targets somewhat tougher). 
Nevertheless, since substitution of the LSPs preferred figures for those published by 
CLG did not alter the statistical results that we observe, we focus our attention on the 
possibility that the target stretch effect has its roots in alternative approaches toward 
(and histories of) community engagement.  
A common theme running through the negotiation of the less demanding 
cohesion targets, however, was the desire to consolidate existing local authority 
practices in building a cohesive community. The strength of the institutional legacy of 
public participation work within those LSPs with less challenging LAAs is especially 
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striking, being suggestive of a more ‘republican’ approach that relies upon political 
means to strengthen community cohesion (Lownes and Thorp, 2011). For example, 
Camden council has a track record of civic engagement demonstrated by its long-
term commitment to a Community Cohesion Working Group (including politicians 
from the three major political parties) and strategies that invite community members 
to work jointly with the organization. Likewise, Rochdale has a strong history of 
working with local communities through various public participatory fora (CLG, 2006), 
and Sandwell, too, has well-established practices for engaging with the many diverse 
ethnic communities within the area and involving them in local decision-making. In 
Knowsley, community development activity was scaled-up to become more 
participatory through the use of Objective one funding in the late 1990s (Hibbitt et al, 
2001). Hastings was one of the pioneers of comprehensive community planning 
(http://www.communityplanning.net/toolkits/UrbanGovToolkitsCPH.pdf)  
The 'republican' approach to promoting social cohesion focuses on the pursuit 
of political consensus (Lowndes and Thorp, 2011), and it may be that in areas with a 
stronger participative political culture there is less need to challenge local public 
service providers to work more closely with civil society groups as this already well-
embedded. The new (or greatly increased) commitment to a ‘communitarian’ 
approach to cohesion within LSPs with the most stretch in their LAA may therefore 
be just the first step towards the eventual development of the kind of institutional 
structures that can facilitate a republican civic culture. The relative contribution of the 
‘communitarian’ and ‘republican’ (and ‘neo-liberal’) approaches to improvements in 
perceptions of social cohesion is thus a question that merits extended consideration 
in subsequent research.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has explored the role that performance contracts can play in building 
social cohesion by analysing whether LAAs spurred improvements in perceptions of 
cohesiveness across the areas served by LSPs in England. The statistical results 
suggest that the rate of improvement in citizens’ perceptions of cohesion is positively 
associated with the introduction of a social cohesion LAA. Nevertheless, the benefits 
of such target-setting emerge most strongly where there is greater stretch in the 
agreed target. To further explore our findings, we drew upon case study material, 
which suggests that LSPs supported both community development activites and 
publicity actions and campaigns in their attempt to positively influence residents’ 
perceptions of cohesion. Although the analysis of the qualitative data did not track in 
detail the actions “on the ground” to improve coordination across service areas and 
organizations, the community cohesion initiatives of LSPs appears likely to be an 
important influence on local outcomes. Our case studies suggest that the 
introduction of tough LAAs for social cohesion may have been an important 
motivation behind an expansion of community development work in LSPs. For those 
LSPs with less challenging targets, the LAA seems to have reinforced the good 
practice already underway in the locality.   
The findings from our study have wider international relevance, particularly 
given the vogue for public sector partnership arrangements (Entiwistle, 2010) and 
the rise of management by targets in many countries (Heinrich and Marschke, 2010). 
Our research indicates that negotiated performance contracts may be an important 
policy tool for national and local policy-makers seeking to improve outcomes for local 
communities. Furthermore, the considerable challenges associated with ensuring 
that joined-up governance works for local people appear (at least partially) to be 
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susceptible to the application of state-sponsored interventions. Indeed, the evidence 
we present seems to indicate that performance contracts with tough targets for 
improving outcomes may be an especially effective way of making agencies 
responsible for dealing with wicked problems work together. Even so, it is clear that 
there are significant challenges to be overcome in the negotiation of performance 
contracts between central and local governments, both in terms of agreeing upon an 
actual target in the first place, and upon the reliability of the measures used to 
evaluate achievement of that target thereafter,  
The amount of time and effort devoted to target negotiation underlines that 
there may be an incentive to ‘game’ the system, and that agencies may become too 
narrowly focused on hitting targets at the expense of other important activities – 
something we were unable to study systematically on this occasion. Nevertheless, 
our case study evidence also indicates that performance contracts can be 
responsible for significant positive changes in the behaviour of public agencies. Of 
course, the areas in which the toughest targets were set face very distinctive 
circumstances, but new social needs and political challenges have arisen as a 
consequence of rapid economic and demographic change all across Europe (see 
Council of Europe, 2007). The experiences of English LSPs with social cohesion 
LAAs may therefore offer valuable lessons for policy-makers elsewhere. 
The coalition government’s decision to abolish the LAA model is an indicator 
both of their claim to support the principles of 'localism' but also of their ideological 
desire to place responsibility for local budget setting at the local government level. It 
is ironic, however, that while LAAs aimed at simplifying central government funding, 
joining-up public services more effectively and targeting funding towards local 
priorities, the rhetoric surrounding its’ abolition has been couched in similar terms. 
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The Minister announced that ‘the abolition of centrally driven targets...will instantly 
remove reporting on 4,700 Whitehall targets from councils’ daily workloads. Instead, 
local areas will be in control of their own delivery targets, answering to residents’ 
(Pickles, 14/10/10). It is too early to conclude what impact this move toward a more 
localist stance will have on improving outcomes for citizens. 
Despite the strength of the findings, the analysis presented here has 
limitations. In particular, longitudinal studies using quantitative and qualitative data 
could further illuminate the effects of target-setting. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
extend the data set we have to track these accurately, because both LAAs and the 
Place Survey on which the measurement of social cohesion depends have been 
abolished. Nevertheless, while the coalition government have removed Labour’s 
emphasis on top-down performance management, there is evidence to suggest that 
LSPs and other partnership bodies are continuing to operate performance 
management frameworks which collate together data on outcomes and objectives 
set out in sustainable community strategies and other plans. The difference is that 
now reporting and accountability is sideways to partner organizations and 
downwards to citizens rather than upwards to central government. By drawing on 
other long-standing indicators of cohesion in local areas, such as crime rates, 
community organizational life and electoral participation and marginality, it may still 
be possible to gain an insight into the merits of locally versus nationally negotiated 
performance contracts.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Min Max s.d. 
Target on .57 .00 1.00 .50 
Target stretch .89 -14.34 15.71 3.93 
People from different backgrounds 
get on well 2008 
75.16 49.10 87.60 6.60 
People from different backgrounds 
get on well 2006 
77.32 48.00 89.00 6.94 
Deprivation 23.32 5.36 46.97 9.29 
Ethnic diversity 2463.31 372.71 8452.82 2221.62 
Age diversity 8729.48 8527.38 8856.82 64.57 
Social class diversity 8780.81 8553.41 8933.46 64.05 
Population  327544 34563 1329718 247194 
Population density  2421.22 61.68 14916.67 2720.77 
Population growth .72 -.69 4.51 .81 
Area in receipt of Neighbourhood 
Renewal Funding 
.47 .00 1.00 .50 
     
Data sources: 
Deprivation 
Age diversity, 
ethnic diversity, 
social class 
diversity, 
population, 
population density, 
population growth 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal Funding 
 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2004) The English indices of deprivation 
2004. London: ODPM. 
Office for National Statistics. (2003). Census 2001: Key statistics for local 
authorities. London: TSO.  
 
 
 
 
http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=615. 
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Table 2 LAAs and social cohesion (rate of improvement) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Slope Robust s.e. Slope Robust s.e. Slope Robust s.e. 
LAA (target on)   .952+ .659   
LAA (target stretch)     .651** .090 
Control variables 
      
Deprivation -.032 .065 -.043 .066 -.007 .047 
Age diversity .001 .006 -.0004 .006 -.002 .005 
Ethnic diversity -.0001 .0004 -.0002 .0004 .0001 .0002 
Social class diversity -.006 .006 -.007 .007 -.012* .006 
Population (log) -.114 .669 -.009 .650 .980* .586 
Population density (log) -.151 .526 -.094 .504 -.157 .383 
Population growth -.221 .363 -.203 .362 .193 .253 
NRF area -.281 1.224 -.167 1.215 .465 .984 
London borough -.258 1.497 -.404 1.473 -1.387* .858 
Metropolitan borough -2.481** 1.055 -2.702** 1.092 -1.802* 1.117 
County council -1.059 1.269 -1.299 1.223 -1.144 1.061 
Constant 51.067 64.153 68.578 64.979 110.472* 54.655 
F-statistic 2.34*  2.33  9.84  
R2 .12  .14  .49  
N 150  150  131  
Note: + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (one-tailed tests).  
